Theoretically this applied to all. In actuality, however, some Palestinians were qualified to work in private associations. Yet there emerged a labor law that conditioned employment in a private association on the acquisition of special authorization from the ministry of labor. This law induces the directors of association to refuse work to Palestinians. In addition, these directors generally accepted to hire some Palestinian workers because they have good qualifications and paid less than the Lebanese with no social security. Due to this, most of the resources of the Palestinians in Lebanon are founded upon exhausting vocational work that the workers of Lebanon often wish to avoid-especially in the fields of construction, agriculture (spraying insecticide) and small, workshops.
Similarly, UNRWA is providing education and vocational training to the youth of Palestinians, especially in the Siblin Institute, but without ensuring them future job in Lebanon. Some Palestinians have managed to enter the professions as teachers, administrators, or employees in the health section of UNRWA. However, there are no more than 3000 Palestinians employed in this international Agency.
Due to this, the budgets of financial resources come from opportunities created by the economic apparatuses of the PLO (the societies of the General Union of Palestinian Trade Unions). Others come from the employment in the vital apparatuses of the Palestinian factions, whether under the banner of the PLO or outside of it, including the information, administrative, political, and security apparatuses.
1) As the increase of the number of Palestinians continues without a broadening of employment opportunities, the already high levels of Palestinians unemployment will witness a steady increase.
2) Prior to the civil war, the broad availability of employment opportunities helped to limit the level of Palestinian unemployment. Since that time, however, these opportunities have been undermined by the persistent civil war in Lebanon.
3) The Development after the Al-Taif Agreement eliminated the role of the militias in Lebanon. The Lebanese government faced this Problem by taking responsibility for the supervising one side of the problem while neglecting the other. On the one hand, the government established a program to absorb the capacities of Lebanese youth who faced unemployment after the dissolution of the militias by incorporating the majority of them into the security apparatuses (army, police, etc.). This enabled them to play a special role in the development of Lebanese society. However, the government confronted the problem without implementing a true social and economic solution, thus leaving itself with an explosive burden to face. On the other hand, the Lebanese government did not take any efforts to absorb the capacities of Palestinians youth in Lebanon, as it did to their Lebanese brothers. The state refused to
incorporate Palestinian fighters and there existed no substitute authority capable of solving their Problem. Further, the PLO did not establish any guidelines or projects to empower the Palestinian youth, to facilitate their adjustment to the post-war situation in Lebanon, or to assist them in transitioning to new roles in the rapidly developing economic conditions in Lebanon. This drove a large number of Palestinian youth to unemployment, adding to already dangerous levels of unemployment within Palestinian society in Lebanon.
Adding to this economic situation characterized by unsustainable pressure, a number of Palestinians and their families to Lebanon after leaving or being forced to leave the Gulf States after the upheavals and offenses that resulted from the second Gulf War. At the same time, the PLO faced enormous decreases in funding that led to a retreat in the levels of support that it provided to Palestinians in Lebanon. Together, these changes brought appalling social consequences.
4) The issue of Palestinian displacement also had economic effects. If we understand that most families had lost their fathers or providers due to martyrdom or for other reasons associated either the war, it becomes clear just how violently the question of the families of martyrs, the disabled, imposed itself on Palestinian society. At its peak, this issue drove many families to seek social assistance. And there was no opportunity for these Palestinian families to benefit from the abundant aid that the Lebanese state provided because it did not consider them Lebanese citizens. Therefore, the burden that these families faced remained oppressive and continued to rest on their own backs.
The most dangerous problem facing Palestinians in Lebanon is unemployment. A number of issues play an important role in intensifying the already difficult crisis. Among the issues that have had negative effects are:
1) Cutbacks in all of forms of support and provisions from UNRWA.
2) The PLO and the Palestinian forces found themselves in a number of predicaments. The PLO and the Palestinian forces are living through the same crisis that all Palestinians are facing. They have been forced to curtail the services that they provide, which has devastated all Palestinian economic and social infrastructure. But each of these groups differs over where to begin and how to organize the restoration of the Palestinian infrastructure. While it is impossible to observe each experience in all specifying, we can note a number of trends in order to draw a general conclusion. The persistent lack of employment over time has produced forms of social-economic association that are highly intertwined and complex. In response to appeals by the fedayeen (guerilla) organizations to defend the revolution, most Palestinian men abandoned the work that they had pursued prior to 1975. They were embraced by the open arms of the revolution and moved directly from the labor market into the ranks of the factions and their association. If they were able to live in complete independence from the conditions of the economic market, it was because they depended on funds from contributions and continuing support of the organizations that they joined. This prevented the formation of a general crisis of unemployment. They were able to support their families by carrying out duties proper to the situation of the market. However, the end of the war brought about a general increase in unemployment, made even more difficult by a catastrophe still affecting the Palestinian community today.
5) Projects: Several plans were introduced with the goal providing social support. It is clear that many have closed their doors. In addition, the plans that remained alive after 1982 have been practically eliminated along with the aspiration to establish new projects. The opportunities for incorporating those devoid of work have either been closed or remain too few to absorb the increasing number of Palestinian families in need. Add the crisis in Palestine after the embargo imposed on the economy of the Palestinian Authority after the election of Hamas in 2006 which led all financial support to the refugees inside and outside Palestine.
The Current Situation of Palestinian labor in Lebanon:
1) According to Lebanese law, Palestinian refugees are considered foreigners in Lebanon. Therefore, the law regulating foreign labor applies to them. Despite the passage of over fifty seven years since they first took refuge in Lebanon, Palestinians have not been granted an exception as a community with a special situation. In fact, the laws to which they are subject necessitate that they obtain a special work permit.
Article 4 (penalties section) of the labor law (4May 1968), in accordance with Ordnance 9816, states that:" The Penalty for he who employs a foreigner, under all labor contract or a manufacturing license, without prior approval or a work permit issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (currently the Ministry of Labor), will be fine. for each day that the foreigner is employed." naturally, this creates a system in which associations and corporations do not hire Palestinian laborers and employees.
As a result of connections that had been established by that time between PLO and the Lebanese authorities, Palestinians laborers were given an oral promise that if they were arrested by the Lebanese authorities that they would merely receive a warning for the first time but if they repeat to work without permit they will be punished.
2) Since the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the expulsion of the PLO, the Ministry of labor has published a series of negative decisions concerning Palestinian labor in Lebanon.
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