For others, restoration of calm implies a temporary halt in resistance operations dictated by such exigencies as the need to regroup and re-organize and facilitate the Israeli departure from Gaza. Proponents of this view insist upon a timeframe and upon conditions that Israel must fulfill--a halt to all forms of aggression, a halt to settlement construction and the "Judaization" of occupied territories, the release of Palestinian prisoners and political detainees and withdrawal to the lines of pre-28 September 2000. As it is recognised that the resistance's power is insufficient to secure Israeli commitment to these demands, the purpose of them is to keep the door open for military operations while taking advantage of the tactical opportunity to build up morale and a sustainable, armed resistance movement.
A third view holds that a ceasefire is not so much an option but an inevitability dictated by current political circumstances and that it must be declared unilaterally on the basis of the Sharm El-Sheikh summit. This view maintains that the Israeli commitment in Sharm El-Sheikh was purely a tactical move motivated by its desire for a smooth withdrawal from Gaza; that it has no sincere intent to halt aggression whether through the overt exercise of violence or in other forms (the construction of the separating wall, settlement expansion, the Judaization of occupied areas, closures and detentions, etc.). It is important to note that Sharon rejected Egyptian proposals for a single summit statement so as to avoid the mutually binding nature of such a document. Separate Palestinian and Israeli statements were issued, the latter permitting a weaker Israeli commitment by rendering it contingent upon prior Palestinian commitments. As a result, whatever ceasefire the Israel agrees to will be inherently fragile and short-lived, so it is pointless to insist upon a timeframe.
In reaching for a practical and balanced formula on this issue, and in placing ceasefire in the context of Gaza, domestic reform, preparations for final status negotiations and ongoing Israeli attempts to impose de facto realities on the ground, the third round of Palestinian national dialogue effectively lifted the ceasefire issue out of a purely time- related context and set it in a functional framework defined by the accomplishment of specific national targets. It also preserved the concept of reciprocity whereby Israel will be expected abide by its commitment to "halt all forms of aggression against our land and people wherever they are and to release all Palestinian detainees." As a result, the ceasefire issue no longer remains an open question contingent upon negotiations that may or may not take place. Simultaneously, it is not confined by a deadline signaling the end of one state and the re- commencement of another. As such, it has become an axis for progress towards national objectives.
Nonetheless, the commitment to "perpetuate the current climate of calm" on a reciprocal basis has a certain hypothetical quality because it was a Palestinian rather than a joint declaration. This rather hazy point in the Cairo Declaration should not escape us, for it could render calm vulnerable to the winds of Israeli escalation. The points in the Cairo Declaration pertaining to domestic reforms are, by contrast, linked solely to the quality of Palestinian resolve and the domestic balances that drive it.
With respect to internal relations, the latest Palestinian dialogue greatly advanced moves towards a unified stance and will mark a historic threshold in the Palestinian national movement if its resolutions are given life. Perhaps the most important breakthrough was resolving the question of a single overarching framework for the national movement. In recognising the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," Hamas made a crucial leap beyond the vague formulas it had previously espoused, referring to the PLO variously as "the representative of the Palestinian people" or "a historic accomplishment of the Palestinian people." With the formula adopted in the Cairo dialogue, the PLO was confirmed as the umbrella organisation of all Palestinian forces and factions.
At the same time, the relevant paragraph of the Declaration consciously avoided wording that would lead to dispute. There was no reference, for example, to a need -- previously put forward by Islamist factions -- to "restructure the PLO on new foundations". Instead, the Declaration established the principle that the PLO was to be "developed and enhanced in accordance with agreed upon bases," which renders everything subsumed under this heading subject to the consensus of the constituent members of the umbrella organisation rather than as a precondition for joining it. To strengthen this sense of collective commitment, the Declaration also called for the creation of a committee to "define the bases for developing and enhancing the PLO". The committee is to consist of the chairman of the National Council, members of the PLO Executive Committee, secretary- generals of all the factions and independent public figures.
Finally, the Declaration resolved to "continue the pursuit of comprehensive reforms in all fields in support of the various aspects of the democratic process," as well as to amend the legislative elections law to enhance the principle of proportional representation and to amend the municipal elections law in the same manner. That the foregoing were presented in the Declaration as recommendations to the PLC does not diminish their substance, in view of the morally binding force of a resolution issued from a meeting convened at this level.
It has been suggested that there is nothing to guarantee that the national consensus voiced in the Cairo Declaration will translate into action anytime soon or even that all its points will be implemented. After all, so the argument goes, the history of national consensuses over less substantial matters should give reason for pause. While admitting the cogency of this argument, it nevertheless fails to take into account the rush of events that have compelled all forces to make crucial decisions. Among these are the need to amend the municipal and legislative electoral laws in advance of polls which should be completed no later than 17 July, and the need for the National Council to meet before the end of the year to make structural changes commensurate with the Islamist movement's long-awaited integration within an overarching PLO.
It is our hope, therefore, that all parties commence work in concert, drawing on the support of Egypt in particular and the Arabs in general, to devise mechanisms for transforming the resolutions of the Cairo Declaration into concrete working papers that will set our national programme on a course to tangible achievement. Experience has taught us that great national initiatives that are followed through by bold action can overcome all obstacles. The Cairo Declaration has all the ingredients of such a great initiative, on condition that it is immediately backed up by mechanisms for putting its provisions in their entirety into effect and precautions are taken against attempts on the part of certain executive circles within the PA to reduce it to no more than a truce agreement. We cannot afford to pass up the opportunity the Declaration has opened up for the realisation of a united coalition within the framework of the PLO, vis-à-vis elected PA governing bodies that faithfully express the vital forces of Palestinian society, amid democratic reforms that will work to sustain the steadfastness of the Palestinian nation, and a plethora of dynamic institutions for mobilising the energies of the people towards the fulfillment of their national aims and aspirations.
It is too good an opportunity to forfeit.
* The writer is a member of the politburo of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and head of its delegation to the Palestinian factions’ talks.
Source: Al-Ahram Weekly (March 31, 2005).
